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Abstract This paper aims to show how adoption of a pragmatist interpreta-
tion permits a satisfactory resolution of the quantum measurement problem.
The classic measurement problem dissolves once one recognizes that it is not
the function of the quantum state to describe or represent the behavior of a
quantum system. The residual problem of when, and to what, to apply the
Born Rule may then be resolved by judicious appeal to decoherence. This
can give sense to talk of measurements of photons and other particles even
though quantum eld theory does not describe particles.
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1 Introduction
Attitudes to the quantum measurement problem vary widely. Optimists deny
there is any problem, while pessimists maintain there is a serious problem
that could be solved only by modifying quantum theory. An intermediate
opinion is that while quantum theory does face a prima facie measurement
problem, this problem is readily resolved by applying the unmodied theory
to interactions that e¢ ciently delocalize the phase of a system into its envi-
ronment during a quantum measurement. Though widespread, this opinion
remains controversial. Attempts to support it by argument have met ob-
jections from both optimists and pessimists intended to show why simply
applying quantum theory to establish the rapid and e¤ectively irreversible
diagonalization of the reduced density operator of a system does not solve
any problem posed by measurement in quantum theory.
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2This paper aims to show how adoption of a pragmatist interpretation
permits a satisfactory resolution of the quantum measurement problem. The
classic measurement problem dissolves once one recognizes that it is not the
function of the quantum state to describe or represent the behavior of a
quantum system. The residual problem of when, and to what, to apply the
Born Rule may then be resolved by judicious appeal to decoherence. This
can give sense to talk of measurements of photons and other particles even
though quantum eld theory does not describe particles.
2 The classic measurement problem
The quantum measurement problem is to reconcile quantum theory with
the fact that measurements have outcomes displaying patterns the theory is
supposed to predict and (as far as possible) explain. The problem is most
acute if one assumes that a systems quantum state gives a complete descrip-
tion of that system, for then the linearity of quantum theory implies that
measurements typically fail to have outcomes, in manifest contradiction to
experimental reports.
Discussions of measurement in quantum theory often begin with an ide-
alized model discussed by von Neumann[1] in which a quantum state of a
system S becomes correlated with that of a (quantum) apparatus system A.
In a simple 2 qubit version of this model S acts as a c-NOT gate as follows:
j+iS 
 j*iA ! j+iS 
 j*iA (1)
j iS 
 j*iA ! j iS 
 j+iA :
By linearity, its action on a non-trivial superposed state (jaj2 ; jbj2 6= 0; 1) of
S is then
(a j+i+ b j i)
 j*i ! a (j+i 
 j*i) + b (j i 
 j+i) (2)
where the system subscripts have been omitted. According to the complete-
ness assumption, equations (1) describe an interaction between an apparatus
in some denite condition (say *, with pointer pointing up) and a system with
some denite property (symbolized either by + or by  ) that is undisturbed
by the interaction, while the apparatus nally assumes a denite condition
correlated to, and so recording, that property.
Applied to (2), however, the completeness assumption implies that after
the interaction the system has neither property + nor  , and the apparatus
pointer points neither up nor down. If this were a faithful model of an actual
quantum measurement, then that measurement would record no outcome for
any non-trivial superposed state of S. Of course, the idealized model is wildly
oversimplied, and one might have held out hope that a more realistic model
of a quantum measurement could restore consistency with experimental ob-
servations. But a long history of failed attempts to solve the measurement
problem by developing more realistic models of measurement as a linear in-
teraction between quantum system and quantum apparatus has e¤ectively
removed that hope, as long as the completeness assumption remains in force.
3Dirac[2] and Von Neumann[1] sought to preserve the completeness as-
sumption by dropping linearity. They took measurement to "collapse" or
reduce the quantum state stochastically onto an eigenstate of the measured
observable. In the simple model this means replacing (2) by
(a j+i+ b j i)
 j*i ! either j+i 
 j*i , with probability jaj2 (3)
or j i 
 j+i , with probability jbj2
This does reconcile quantum theory with the fact that measurements
have outcomes. But it raises measurementto the status of a primitive term
in the principles of quantum theory, needed to mark the suspension of the
normal continuous, linear dynamical evolution of the quantum state, and its
temporary replacement by a nonlinear, stochastic evolution. This disqualies
quantum theory from giving any further account of the measurement process,
leaving it quite unclear under what physical circumstances this process is
supposed to occur. Moreover, many actual measurements do not leave the
measured system in an eigenstate of the measured observable (Pauli[3] called
these measurements of the second kind), and a measurement of a photon
typically destroys or absorbs it.
Wigner[4, chapter 12] gave a classic restatement of the measurement prob-
lem. He took the problem to be that of reconciling the continuous, linear
evolution of an unmeasured systems quantum state with its discontinuous,
stochastic evolution on measurement in the simple model, this means rec-
onciling (2) with (3). Noting that (2) establishes a statistical correlation
between results of possible observations on A and S, he concludes that while
applying quantum theory to the measurement interaction (as does (2) in the
simple model) does not (in general) show how measurement puts the mea-
sured system in a denite state, it does enable one to replace this task with
the task of showing how observation of the apparatus puts it in a denite
state.
The problem of measurement on the object is thereby transformed
into the problem of an observation on the apparatus. Clearly, further
transfers can be made by introducing a second apparatus to ascer-
tain the state of the rst, and so on. However, the fundamental point
remains unchanged and a full description of an observation must re-
main impossible since the quantum-mechanical equations of motion
are causal and contain no statistical element, whereas the measure-
ment does.[4, p.158]
A statistical element could be introduced into a quantum analysis of mea-
surement by representing the initial state of a complex apparatus by a mix-
ture of states from the eigenspace spanned by eigenvectors of the (massively
degenerate) pointer position observable, all with the same eigenvalue. This
could be regarded as the appropriate way of representing ones ignorance
of the exact microstate of the apparatus. But this doesnt work, as Wigner
shows:1
1 Von Neumann [1, pp.437-9] already in 1932 gave a similar demonstration of the
failure of this "often proposed" attempt to reconcile the deterministic evolution of
4It must be concluded thatmeasurements which leave the system object-
plus-apparatus in one of the states with a denite position of the
pointer cannot be described by the linear laws of quantum mechanics.
([4, p.164] italics in the original)
This and other generalizations of the simple quantum model (2) of mea-
surement establish the incompatibility between the linearity of quantum me-
chanical evolution and the occurrence of denite measurement outcomes only
if the quantum state completely describes a system to which it is ascribed.
Here and elsewhere in this article Wigner seems to accept this complete-
ness assumption. But earlier indications that this cannot be his considered
view are conrmed by his subsequent answer to the question "What is the
state vector?" This makes it clear that he has abandoned the completeness
assumption after initially seeming to accept it.
...the state vector is only a shorthand expression of that part of our
information concerning the past of the system which is relevant for
predicting (as far as possible) the future behavior thereof. ... the laws
of quantum mechanics only furnish probability connections between
results of subsequent observations carried out on a system. ([4, p.166]
italics in the original)
Here he advocates a very di¤erent view of the role of the quantum state,
not as describing physical reality but as predicting our observations of it.
This promises to dissolve the classical measurement problem. Well soon see
how far it is able to do so. But rst note the rather articial character of that
problem. Dirac and Von Neumann notwithstanding, immediate repetition of
an actual measurement of a quantum observable does not always, or even
usually, give the same result: it may disturb or even destroy the measured
system. When necessary, we apply linear quantum theory in studying how
measurement a¤ects a system. Quantum measurements must be carefully
designed if they are to full their intended function. Their design involves
application of the linear laws of quantum theory itself, not some primitive
stochastic law like (3). The only useful function of Von Neumanns[1] postu-
lation of stochastic collapse (his process 1) is to account for the possibility of
denite outcomes of quantum measurements. But there is a need for some-
thing to play that role only if the quantum state completely describes the
behavior of a quantum system.
3 How to dissolve it
If one accepts Wigners[4] view of the quantum state one can try to reconcile
(2) with (3) like this. (2) represents the evolution of information concerning
the past of S and A. Observation of A adds new information: either that *
the quantum state with the statistical results of observations. This may have been
the rst of many demonstrations of "the insolubility of the quantum measurement
problem" involving successive removal of idealizations of the simple model (2) of
measurement: these now include, for example, [5],[6],[7],[8].
5is true, or that + is true. On the basis of this new information, one should
update the information represented by the right-hand side of (2) either to
the information represented by j+i 
 j*i or to the information represented
by j i 
 j+i. The right-hand side of (3) correctly represents the state of
information of one who knows of the observation of A but is ignorant of its
result, while the right-hand side of (2) correctly represents the information
concerning the past of S and A prior to observation of A. (2) and (3) do
not represent incompatible states of a¤airs, since no quantum state involved
represents any state of a¤airs.
On this view, the function of a quantum state is not to represent the
condition of a system to which it is ascribed, but to summarize information
gleaned from prior observations that is relevant to predicting the probability
of each possible outcome of any future observation. Wigner[4] claims to be
reporting the orthodox view on measurement of the late 1920s: his view of
the quantum state was held by Heisenberg[9], Peierls[10] and others and has
a number of contemporary advocates.2 The view promises to dissolve the
classic measurement problem. If one denies that the evolution of a quantum
state represents the changing physical condition of the system to which it
is ascribed, it is no longer problematic that this state evolves in radically
di¤erent ways according as the system is or is not measured. The quantum
state does not track changes in the system, but in the available information
relevant to predicting outcomes of future measurements on the system. This
information changes discontinuously as more information becomes available,
namely the results of relevant observations. In the Heisenberg picture, the
quantum state changes only when this happens: in the Schrödinger picture,
the state changes continuously, absent observational input. These are two
di¤erent ways of keeping track of the information available to an agent who
learns nothing new from observation, if that information is to continue reli-
ably to predict statistics for outcomes of future measurements on the system.
By denying the completeness assumption, Wigners view of the quantum
state removes much of the sting of the measurement problem. On this view
there is no inconsistency between the right hand side of (2) and an obser-
vation report of a denite (up or down) position of the apparatuss pointer
after it has interacted with the system. But the view faces di¢ culties of its
own. If the state vector is only a shorthand expression of the relevant part
of our information, then the state vector should be updated whenever one
of us learns of the result of a relevant observation, even though that new
information remains unavailable to others.
Wigner was aware of this consequence of his view, even highlighting it
in his "friend" paradox.[4, pp.179-81] If a friend updates "our" information
on learning the outcome of a quantum measurement on a non-trivially su-
perposed state conducted in an isolated laboratory, then anyone outside the
laboratory should immediately adopt a new quantum state for the entire
laboratory (including the "friend" as a physical object) that is in principle
empirically distinguishable from the non-trivial superposition resulting from
2 Friederich[11] lists 12 recent papers developing versions of similar views in his
second footnote.
6the linear evolution of its prior quantum state. The decision to count the
"friend" as one of us has empirical consequences.
To avoid the threat of solipsism, Wigner concluded that by becoming con-
sciously aware of the outcome of a quantum measurement, someone could
a¤ect outcomes of future observations in a way that could not be brought
about by any interaction with an unconscious physical system. This view
now requires modication of quantum theory, and acknowledgment that Von
Neumanns process 1 is a physical process that supersedes linear evolution
just when the outcome of a quantum measurement is consciously registered.
This is clearly not a satisfactory solution to the measurement problem. It in-
volves not only modifying quantum theory, but replacing the unmodied the-
ory with a vaguely formulated mixture of physics and psychology. Wigners
"friend" paradox is a reductio ad absurdum of the view that the state vector
is only a shorthand expression of the relevant part of our information. But a
natural variant of the view escapes the paradox and o¤ers renewed hope of
dissolving the measurement problem.
The key is to recognize that di¤erently situated agents, with di¤erent in-
formation available to them, should ascribe di¤erent quantum states to one
and the same system. This does not make the quantum state subjective. A
system has an objective quantum state relative to the information accessible
to an agent in each specic situation: but in so far as the accessible informa-
tion depends on the physical situation of an (actual or potential) agent, so too
does the quantum state for that agent-situation. This point has been explic-
itly recognized by some[10],[11],[12],[13],[14]. Brun et al.[15] show how much
state assignments can di¤er on this view of a quantum state as a shorthand
expression of that part of a situated agents information which is relevant for
predicting (as far as possible) the outcomes of measurements on a quantum
system.3
On this latest view, a system is not in a quantum state, and does not have
a (unique) quantum state.[13] Rather, it may be assigned a quantum state
by an agent for the purposes of applying quantum theory, and the state to be
assigned is a function of the (actual or hypothetical) physical (and therefore
epistemic) situation of the one who assigns it. Relativizing a quantum state
assignment to the information available to an agent helps to dissolve the
measurement problem, but it does not yet answer an important question:
How is an agent to update her quantum state on learning the result of a
quantum measurement?
Dirac and Von Neuman took measurement of an observable to leave a
system in an eigenstate of the corresponding operator with eigenvalue equal
to the measured value. This gives a unique updating rule only following the
measurement of an observable with non-degenerate eigenvalues whose eigen-
vectors span the systems Hilbert space. Lüders rened this to the following
3 Accepting the relativization of quantum state assignments to agent-situation
also makes it easier to reconcile quantum theory with violations of Bell inequali-
ties without any physical nonlocality and in conformity with fundamental Lorentz
invariance (see [12], [13], [14], [16],[17]).
7unique updating rule for a measurement of A that locates its value in :
  ! 0 = P
A()PA()
Tr[PA()PA()]
; (4)
where PA() projects onto a subspace of vectors, each of which predicts
that a measurement of observable A will (with probability 1) nd a value in
set . A state updated in accordance with this rule will (with probability 1)
yield the same outcome in an immediately repeated measurement of A, while
leaving unchanged the relative probabilities for outcomes in a measurement
of commuting observable B compatible with that outcome for A. Despite
guring prominently in some views of quantum theory, [18],[19],[20] Lüders
rule is clearly an incorrect way to update a quantum state after many actual
measurements.[3],[21] The momentum of a neutron will change if it is mea-
sured by observing the track of a (previously stationary) recoil proton in a
bubble chamber: measuring the position of a photon absorbs it at a localized
detector. Pauli classied such measurements as of the second kind in order to
distinguish them from measurements conforming to Von Neumanns process
1.
Actual measurements are more realistically modeled by POVMs[22], and
the state following a POVM fEig may be specied in terms of a set of
measurement operators fMig compatible with (but not dened by) it:
Ei =M
y
iMi (5)
in which case the appropriate updating rule for a measurement with ith
outcome is
  ! 0 = MiM
y
i
Tr[MiM
y
i ]
(6)
There is no general rule for associating a particular measurement device
with a POVM, nor for updating the quantum state of a system following a
measurement by that device. One cannot specify either fEig or fMig theo-
retically without providing a quantum analysis of the interaction involved in
the measurement. That analysis will depend on an application of the linear
evolution of the combined state of system and detector (and detector of the
detector...), which concludes either by applying classical physics to some de-
vice or with the claim that the "pointer position" or "click" of some detector
was directly observable. The residual measurement problem is posed by the
need to justify this concluding "objectication" step.
4 The residual measurement problem
With advances in technology and increased application of quantum theory
to individual systems (e.g. in quantum optics and quantum computing), its
has become increasingly important to design and characterize quantum mea-
suring devices. Experimentally, tomography of quantum detectors has been
8employed to determine what POVM characterizes a photon detector by "mea-
suring the measuring device".[23] This involved comparing the detector re-
sponse (in the form of a discrete number of "clicks", each intended to indicate
detection of a single photon) with the probability of observed photon number
predicted by applying the Born Rule to a pulse of incident laser light whose
quantum state was taken to be approximately coherent. Increased complex-
ity makes it harder and harder to model the operation of a detector quantum
mechanically as a linear interaction between system and detector. Braginsky
et al.[24] even said
The Schrödinger equation cannot tell us the connection between the
design of the measuring device and the nature of the measurement,
because the Schrödinger equation neither describes nor governs the
process of measurement. (p.38)
Their reason for saying this was that while the Schrödinger equation is
reversible and deterministic, the reduction of the wave-function on measure-
ment is irreversible and non-deterministic. But as Wigner already recognized,
this does not prevent one from modeling the system/detector interaction by
the linear evolution of their joint state: it merely requires one to accept that
the measurement is not complete until the detector records a "click" in a way
that (randomly) singles out one component of the resulting superposition.
This is the residual measurement problem: Given a superposed entan-
gled state (such as that of quantum system and quantum detector), under
what circumstances is it legitimate to infer that (at least) one of the entan-
gled systems has some denite property, with probability given by the Born
Rule? The completeness assumption implied that this is never a legitimate
inference: but that assumption has now been rejected along with a repre-
sentational view of the quantum state. The no-go theorems of Gleason[25],
Bell[26], Kocken and Specker[27] (among others) imply that this is not al-
ways a legitimate inference. To resolve the residual measurement problem we
need to formulate and defend a better answer. This can be done by applying
the quantum theory of decoherence in the right way.
5 How to resolve it
In explaining how quantum decoherence helps solve the residual measure-
ment problem, it will be useful to be able to refer to a simple model of
decoherence introduced by Zurek[28] and further discussed in Cucchetti, Paz
and Zurek[29]. Consider a single quantum system A interacting with a sec-
ond "environment" system E. A is a single qubit, and its environment E is
modeled by a collection of N qubits. One can think of each qubit as realized
by a spin 12 system, so that j*i (j+i) represent z-spin up (down) eigenstates of
the Pauli spin operator ^z of A, while j"ik (j#ik) represent z-spin up (down)
eigenstates of ^kz for the the kth environment spin subsystem.
9The individual Hamiltonians H^A, H^E of A and E are assumed to be zero,
while the interaction Hamiltonian H^AE has the form
H^AE =
1
2
^z 

NX
k=1
gk^
k
z : (7)
If A, E are assumed to be initially assigned pure, uncorrelated states
 A = (a j*i+ b j+i) ; (8)
 E =
NY
k=1
(k j"ik + k j#ik) (9)
then the initial state
	(0) =  A 
  E (10)
evolves according to the Schrödinger equation, becoming
	(t) = (a j*i jE*(t)i+ b j+i jE+(t)i) (11)
at time t where
jE*(t)i =
NY
k=1
 
ke
igkt j"ik + ke igkt j#ik

= jE+( t)i : (12)
The state of A, calculated by tracing over the Hilbert space of E, is therefore
^A(t) = jaj2 j*i h*j+ abr(t) j*i h+j+ abr(t) j+i h*j+ jbj2 j+i h+j : (13)
The coe¢ cient r(t) = hE*(t)jE+(t)i appearing in the o¤-diagonal terms of ^A
here is
r(t) =
NY
k=1
h
cos 2gkt+ i

jkj2   jkj2

sin 2gkt
i
: (14)
Cucchetti, Paz and Zurek[29] show that jr(t)j tends to decrease rapidly with
increasing N and very quickly approaches zero with increasing t. More pre-
cisely, while jr(t)j2 uctuates, its average magnitude at any time is propor-
tional to 2 N , and, for fairly generic values of the gk, it decreases with time
according to the Gaussian rule jr(t)j2 _ e   2t2 , where   depends on the
distribution of the gk as well as the initial state of E. This result is relatively
insensitive to the initial state of E, which need not be assumed to have the
product form (9), though if the environment is initially in an eigenstate of
(7) jr(t)j = 1 so the state of A will su¤er no decoherence. Since r(t) is an
almost periodic function of t for nite N , it will continue to return arbitrar-
ily closely to 1 at various times: but for N corresponding to a macroscopic
environment Zurek[28] estimated that the corresponding "recurrence" time
exceeds the age of the universe.
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Zurek[30] called the unitary evolution (2) a premeasurement, and stressed
that no actual measurement can be said to have taken place until A inter-
acts with its environment. This interaction may be represented by (7) in an
extension of this simple model. The result is this generalization of (11)
	(t) = (a j+i j*i jE*(t)i+ b j i j+i jE+(t)i) ; (15)
where jE*(t)i ; jE+(t)i are given by (12). Zurek[28] defends a slight generaliza-
tion of this model to an n-dimensional Hilbert spaceHS and n+1 dimensional
Hilbert space HA as an idealized model of measurement on two grounds.
First, the form (15) preserves the correlation between component states
of S,A under the inuence of the environmental interaction (7), and thereby
singles out a "pointer basis" j*i ; j+i of states in HA that correlate with pre-
ferred states j+i ; j i of S. This is important, since the right-hand side of (2),
representing the state after the premeasurement, may be expressed as an en-
tangled superposition in a continuous innity of other orthogonal bases of
HA. But none of these correlations will be preserved under (7). This denes
the interaction as a measurement of an observable Q on S corresponding
to a self-adjoint operator Q^ of which j+i ; j i are eigenvectors. Second, as
jE*(t)i ; jE+(t)i quickly become (and remain indenitely) very nearly orthog-
onal, the reduced state SA similarly stably becomes very nearly diagonal
in the fj+i ; j ig  fj*i ; j+ig basis of HS 
HA. Zurek apparently believes
this endows claims about both the value of Q and the value of the "pointer
position" P (corresponding to operator P^ on HA with eigenvectors j*i ; j+i)
with enough signicance to justify application of the Born Rule, warranting
one condently to expect these values rapidly and stably to become both
denite and correlated.
The idealizations involved in this simple model are so severe that it can
reasonably be applied to few if any actual cases in which physicists take
themselves to measure the value of a magnitude on a quantum system. It
covers only measurements of the rst kind: it assumes the quantum states
of A and E are initially pure, so that the initial quantum states of S and
A are unentangled and both are unentangled with the state of E: it further
assumes the initial state of A is j*iA: it neglects any e¤ects of the individual
Hamiltonians of S,A,E on the evolution of the total state: and it assumes
that the environment does not interact with S directly, or with A during the
interaction between S and A. But if the model is generalized to relax these
idealizations, it is not clear that it retains the features that Zurek took to
ground its defense as a model of measurement.
According to Zurek[30]
In the idealized case, the preferred basis was distinguished by its
ability to retain perfect correlations with the system in spite of deco-
herence. This remark will serve as a guide in other situations. It will
lead to a criterion the predictability sieve used to identify preferred
states in less idealized circumstances. (p.734)
However, his applications of the predictability sieve in less idealized cir-
cumstances typically concern only two systems: while these are often labeled
A and E, a third system S plays no role. So he e¤ectively abandons his rst
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line of defense that his idealized model is of measurement. But by doing so he
suggests a more exible analysis of the role of decoherence in measurement.
The idea is to drop any requirement that refers to the post-measurement
condition of the measured system itself, and concentrate only on securing the
direct applicability of the Born Rule to signicant claims about the "pointer
position" of a system thought to have interacted with it. As we saw, the
subsequent state of the system depends on details of the measurement in-
teraction that are irrelevant to justifying application of the Born Rule to
claims about the outcome recorded by a detector. One can think of the mea-
sured system as e¤ectively absorbed into an environment E = E0  S that
also includes degrees of freedom of a physical apparatus independent of its
"pointer" degree of freedom. The "pointer position" P is then represented
by an operator P^ in a Hilbert space HA spanned by a preferred basis of its
eigenstates, the "pointer states". The total state is then represented in HA

 HE .
So consider an interaction between a system S and an "apparatus" AE0
with initial states j iiS ; j 0ji respectively, where
j 0ji = j'0iA 
 j'jiE0 : (16)
Here j'0iA represents the "ready to measure" state of the "pointer" subsys-
tem, and j'jiE0 is some basis vector in an environment-system Hilbert space
E0 that also represents degrees of freedom of the physical apparatus. To serve
as a measurement, the interaction should set up a correlation between the
initial state of the system and the value of a "pointer position" magnitude P
on the apparatus. In the absence of interaction with the environment, such
an interaction may be thought of as follows (for some normalized jijkiS ,jijkiE0)
j'0iA 
 j iiS 
 j'jiE0  ! j'iiA 

P
k
ijk(jijkiS 
 jijkiE0) : (17)
and so, by linearity,
j'0iA 

X
i
ci j iiS 
 j'jiE0  !
X
i
ci(j'iiA 

P
k
ijk(jijkiS 
 jijkiE0)):
(18)
But suppose interaction between A and E0 rapidly renders environmental
states corresponding to distinct values of i e¤ectively orthogonal
(E0hi0jkjijkiE0 ! 0 for i0 6= i). Then the reduced state A will stably
approach diagonal form in the j'iiA basis. A more realistic model would
take the initial "apparatus" state to be a mixture of states of the form (16),
with variable j. The reduced state A will stably approach diagonal form in
the j'iiA basis in this model also. While this remains a very crude model of
measurement, I think it will help to indicate the role of decoherence in es-
tablishing the applicability of the Born Rule to the results of measurements,
as represented by signicant claims about the value of a magnitude ("the
pointer position") on a system that serves as an apparatus.
The residual quantum measurement problem was to answer the question:
Given a superposed entangled state, under what circumstances is it legiti-
mate to infer that (at least) one of the entangled systems has some denite
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property, with probability given by the Born Rule? When this question was
posed in the previous section, it may have appeared that the relevant entan-
gled state is that of a quantum system and quantum detector(s) following
their interaction. Now we see the importance of acknowledging the role of an
environment that makes quantum system plus quantum detector(s) itself an
open system.4 In terms of the simplied model, environmental interactions
transfer the relevant entanglement from S +A to A+E. Their e¤ect is then
to delocalize the phase of A into E so that the reduced state of A rapidly
and stably becomes very nearly diagonal in the "pointer basis".
According to the pragmatist interpretation I outline in [14], this is exactly
what is required to license application of the Born Rule to claims about the
position of As pointer. The Born Rule may be applied only to claims with a
well-dened meaning. The signicance of a claim depends on the context, as
specied by the nature and extent of decoherence. When there is extensive
and robust decoherence in the "pointer basis", a claim about the pointer
position is richly signicant, since it supports dynamic and measurement in-
ferences: in this context, repeated measurements of the pointer position do
give the same result if repeated quickly enough, and one can consistently
take such results to conrm that the pointer position evolves continuously,
whether or not it is measured. The Born Rule is not limited in its applica-
tion to measurement outcomes (however these may be characterized). But the
claims to which it may justiably be applied do include some that we endow
with the additional signicance of reporting the outcome of some measure-
ment, whether in a laboratory experiment or elsewhere (e.g. in the context
of measurement-based quantum computation).
Quantum theory cannot account for the fact that claims about the val-
ues of magnitudes have truth-values or that measurements have outcomes
for the simple reason that its application presupposes that they do or more
specically that the set of signicant claims of the form Q 2 concerning
a system to which the Born Rule is applicable contains a Boolean algebra of
events over which a Boolean homomorphism denes a (classical) truth-value
assignment. But it is not at all surprising that a measurement has some out-
come. Quantum theory is empirically based on observations of measurement
outcomes: and application of the Born Rule to a corresponding claim leads
one to assign some denite (though sometimes small) credence to whatever
outcome is observed. Since the application of the Born Rule is not limited
to the outcomes of measurements, it is equally unsurprising that the world
can be truly described by many other claims enough to constitute a rich
description in non-quantum terms.
Quantum decoherence through environmental delocalization of phase has
often been take to explain the appearance of a classical realm, though both
the meaning and truth of this claim remain controversial. One could take
the claim to be that classical physics is reducible to quantum theory, or (in
a di¤erent usage) that quantum theory reduces to classical physics in some
4 In fact the relevant environment includes subsystems of the detector(s) cor-
responding to degrees of freedom other than those associated with the "pointer
observables" whose positions are intended to record an outcome of the measure-
ment.
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appropriate limit (e.g. as ~! 0). The concepts of reduction involved here cry
out for further clarication. But the pragmatist interpretation of quantum
theory outlined in [14] encourages no such reductionist claim, since on this in-
terpretation one does not use quantum states to describe a "quantum world"
within which a (quasi)classical realm may emerge. An agent is well-advised
to use quantum states as a guide in assessing the content and credibility of
various claims about physical systems, and sometimes is justied in wholly
believing some such claims. But the truth of those claims does not then rest
on that of any underlying quantum truths about these or any other systems.
If that is what Bohr meant by his reported remark "There is no quantum
world" then he was correct.[31]
Nevertheless, an agent applying quantum theory may be warranted in
making claims that would also be warranted within classical physics, and
these claims may be justied by suitable application of the quantum theory
of environmental decoherence. Hornberger, Sipe and Arndt[32] applied the
quantum theory of environmental decoherence to show why one would be
warranted in expecting the visibility of the interference pattern to decrease
in the experiment of Hackermüller et al.[33] as they increased the laser heat-
ing of the fullerene molecules that passed through their interferometer until
the pattern accorded with classical physics. The theory of quantum Brown-
ian motion[34] already provides a simplied model of how claims about the
classical trajectory of a quantum particle bound in a harmonic potential may
be warranted as a result of environmental decoherence. A more sophisticated
application of the quantum theory of decoherence would be expected to pro-
vide an even stronger warrant for claims about the xed locations of the
fullerenes deposited on the silicon surface in the experiment of Ju¤man et
al.[35] claims that would also be a consequence of applying classical physics
to their initial locations on the surface.
There are cases in which quantum theory itself seems to imply a claim
about the value of a magnitude. Ehrenfests theorem is even adduced as a case
in which a law of classical mechanics (Newtons second law of motion) follows
from a law of quantum mechanics in suitable circumstances. For a single
particle subject to a potential (r; t) the following is an easy consequence of
the Schrödinger equation:
d
dt
hpi =  hri (19)
This closely resembles Newtons second law in the form dp=dt =  r. But
what it actually says is rather di¤erent: that the rate of change of the expec-
tation value of momentum equals minus the expectation value of the gradient
of the potential. A claim about the expectation value of a magnitude is not
a claim about the actual value of that magnitude. According to the prag-
matist interpretation outlined in [14] its function is not to describe values
of magnitudes but rather to guide an agents expectation as to their values.
Indeed, the terminology of "expectation values" nicely captures this func-
tion. Mathematically, an expected value is the mean of a random variable
in a probability distribution in this case calculated by application of the
Born Rule to a quantum state. But how can such applications be justied
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in the case of (19) when the magnitudes on either side of the equation are
represented by non-commuting operators that have no joint distribution in
any quantum state?
The quantum theory of decoherence can help answer this question. If the
particle in question is subject to the right kind of environmental interaction
(e.g. weakly coupled to an oscillator bath, as in the case of quantum Brown-
ian motion[34]) its reduced quantum state will rapidly and robustly become
approximately diagonal in a basis of coherent states. This will justify applica-
tion of the Born Rule both to claims about its position r (and functions such
as (r)) and to claims about its momentum p. When the Wigner function of
this quantum state is non-negative everywhere it is even possible to represent
these as deriving from a corresponding joint probability distribution, though
such representation is merely a technical convenience. Any agent applying
quantum theory is then warranted in believing both that the particle has
some reasonably well dened position and momentum and that these will al-
most certainly evolve continuously in accordance with Newtons second law.
If the agent is warranted in ascribing a particular narrow Gaussian wave-
function as the initial quantum state, then the warrant extends to condent
belief in claims restricting the particles position and momentum to values
close to the peak of that evolving Gaussian.
Among many similar examples in which the quantum theory of decoher-
ence justies replacing quantum expectation values by corresponding claims
about non-quantum magnitudes is this important claim:
When a constant voltage V is applied across a Josephson junction, an
alternating current I with frequency 2(e=h)V ows across the junc-
tion.
Each of the voltage V and the current I here results from identication of
a non-quantum magnitude with an expectation value in a quantum analysis
that associates "macroscopic wave-functions" with the superconductor on ei-
ther side of the junction. In any experimental realization of this AC Joseph-
son e¤ect, it is environmental decoherence acting on these wave-functions
that justies application of the Born Rule, though no simple model of such
decoherence may be available.
6 Measuring photons
Measurement of photons has always been di¢ cult to reconcile with the
Dirac-Von Neumann account of measurement.[36] This process can be ac-
commodated within the more general POVM framework by associating it
with measurement operators such as fMng (n = 0; 1; :::), each element of
which projects a Fock state of the quantized electromagnetic eld onto the
vacuum state:
Mn = j0i hnj : (20)
But notice that these do not yield any subsequent state of the photon, but
the "zero-photon" state of the electromagnetic eld in other words, the
measurement destroys the measured photon. A more general treatment of
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measurement of the quantized electromagnetic eld may be given in terms
of measurement operators that modify its state in ways that do not cor-
respond naturally to measurements of photons, such as the coherent state
measurement operators
M = 1=
p
 ji hj : (21)
Nevertheless, many experiments in quantum optics are taken to involve mea-
surements on single photons, and the Born Rule is applied to claims about
their properties, including even their positions. How can this be justied?
Sinha et al.[37] set out to test an important implication of the Born Rule:
In the interference pattern resulting from more than two paths, the interfer-
ence terms are the sum of the interference terms in the patterns resulting
from these paths taken two at a time. They matched observed interference
patterns against an instance of this implication in a variety of experiments
involving the interference of light at up to three slits. One of these involved
single photons, detected in coincidence with a second heraldphoton from
an entangled pair by two avalanche photodiodes. The experimental inter-
ference pattern is generated by moving a multimode optical ber uniformly
across a plane intercepting light from the slits and counting the relative num-
ber of photons detected in each small region.
One can understand this experiment as a test of the Born Rule only if
that rule is applicable to the experimental data. Perhaps the simplest way
to apply it would be to claims of the form:
(X) The position of the photon lies between x and x+x
Here x represents a small interval of positions in a direction perpendicu-
lar to the slits and the optical axis, and the claim concerns the position in the
tracking plane where a photon enters the ber. But there are reasons to ques-
tion the signicance of a claim of this form here. There is no well-behaved
position operator in relativistic quantum theories, and it is di¢ cult if not
impossible to understand a relativistic quantum eld theory as describing
localized particles.[38],[39],[40] Any talk of photons acquires whatever the-
oretical signicance it has from applications of the quantum theory of the
electromagnetic eld. In cavity quantum electrodynamics, for example, it is
often convenient to use the term photonwhen considering quantized energy
states of the eld in the cavity.
Photon talk also acquires practical signicance in quantum optics exper-
iments like that of Sinha et al. In the course of their review of several such
experiments, Zeilinger et al.[41] say
...the quantum state is simply a tool to calculate probabilities. Prob-
abilities of the photon being somewhere? No, we should be even more
cautious and only talk about probabilities of a photon detector ring
if it is placed somewhere. One might be tempted, as was Einstein, to
consider the photon being localized at some place with us just not
knowing that place. But, whenever we talk about a particle, or more
specically a photon, we should only mean that which a click in the
detectorrefers to.
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Indeed, Sinha et al. take the Born Rule to specify the probability (density)
to nd or detect a particle at position r, not for a particle to be at r. But of
course such appeals to experimental practice do not answer the interpretative
question as to exactly when and why an agent applying quantum theory
is entitled to claim that a particle has been detected at position r. In the
pragmatist interpretation outlined in [14] the quantum theory of decoherence
can help answer this question.
In the present situation, no signicant decoherence occurs before the
quantized electromagnetic eld interacts through the photoelectric e¤ect with
electrons in the avalanche photodiodes. Such interaction directly endows a
claim about a system with a rich empirical signicance only at the photodi-
odes themselves. But it may be taken thereby indirectly to render signicant
some claim about photon position at the interception plane across which the
multimode optical ber is tracked. For the backtracking inference from a
warranted claim about the value of a magnitude at the photodiode to some
claim about photon position in the interception plane may seem justied
here by the assumption that the multimode ber provided the only available
channel through which the eld could propagate. This suggests that such an
inference could legitimize application of the Born Rule to claims of the form
(X) concerning the position of photons in the interception plane. But that is
not quite right.
The photodiode is designed to produce a substantial (milliampere) elec-
tron current when light injects even a single electron into the depleted region
by the photoelectric e¤ect. In practical terms, the subsequent amplication
process in the photodiode is highly irreversible, but it is not this irreversibil-
ity but rather the associated decoherence that ensures that some claim about
a magnitude on a system within the diode directly acquires substantial em-
pirical signicance. This is not, however, a claim about the position of a
photon.
Neither I nor the authors of Sinha et al. have presented any quantum
model of decoherence at the avalanche photodiode in the experiment de-
scribed. But it is not necessary to advance such a model to be sure that
almost immediately after any electron is freed by the photoelectric e¤ect a
claim about some system within the diode will acquire substantial empiri-
cal signicance through interactions with the systems environment. Exactly
what this system is and what magnitude gures in the claim is immaterial
to the operation of the photodiode. So in practice the e¤ective nature and
location of the detector clickcannot be specied more precisely than some-
where within the photodiodes "window" of sensitivity. The spatial window
is comparable to the 65 micron core of the multimode ber whose aperture
probes the interference: the temporal window is of the order of nanoseconds.
But the practical impossibility of verifying, or even unambiguously speci-
fying, any more precise claim about a system at the photodiode here is not
what determines the limits of empirical signicance of such magnitude claims
and whether this justies applying the Born Rule to them.
Electrons ejected from a metal surface by the photoelectric e¤ect have a
denite energy, as experiments reveal. Similarly, it is generally assumed that
when an electron is ejected into the depletion region of a photodiode it has
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a denite energy, equal to the di¤erence between the energy of the photon
involved and the electrons binding energy. This goes along with the idea that
the electron was ejected from a denite energy level an assumption that
implicitly depends on a model of decoherence for the crystalline structure of
the semiconductor. So a claim of the form
(Y) The kinetic energy of an ejected electron is E > 0
owes its substantial empirical signicance to energy decoherence a¤ecting
systems within the photodiode. One may take this as a claim about an event
corresponding to detection of the photon to what Zeilinger et al. call a
click in the detector even prior to the electron avalanche it induces. On
the interpretation sketched in [14], it is claims such as this that indirectly
justify application of the Born Rule to claims about photon position in the
interception plane.
Taken literally, the claim (X) has no empirical content in this experiment
since it cannot be grounded either in the quantum theory of light or in ex-
perimental practice. To justify application of the Born Rule the claim must
therefore be reformulated or reinterpreted. So consider the following refor-
mulation, which, as we have seen, accords well with how many physicists
express themselves.
(X0) The position of the photon is detected between x and x+x
The content of (X0) is quite unclear as it stands. But one can now use an
inferentialist account of content to clarify it. The key is to link the content
of (X0) to that of (Y) by taking it as an essential part of the content of
(X0) that it follow by a justied (though not deductively valid) inference
from (Y). This is not to equate the contents of (X0) and (Y) these claims
certainly dont mean the same thing. But (X0) owes its substantial empirical
signicance to this close inferential relation to (Y), and that is what justies
application of the Born Rule not to (X) but to (X0). Here and elsewhere,
the empirical signicance of a magnitude claim about a system (in this case,
the claim (X0)) hinges on what actually happens later. Moreover, the pivotal
later event may involve a distinct system (the ejected electron, in this case).
7 Measurement and Quantum Fields
We saw that measurement of photons is just a special case of measurement
of the state of the quantized electromagnetic eld. This is only one of many
relativistic quantum elds that gure in contemporary physics. That electro-
magnetism has well understood manifestations as a classical eld even at low
energies makes it a useful example to introduce a discussion of the special
issues quantum eld theories raise for the measurement problem.
Traditionally, the outcome of a quantum measurement was taken as a
record of the value of an observable on the measured system. But the POVM
framework allows an understanding of the measurement process as giving
probabilistic information about the quantum state of the measured system
that may take a more general form, not necessarily focused on a specic ob-
servable. Measurements represented by the measurement operators (20) and
18
(21) yield di¤erent probabilistic information about the state of a quantized
electromagnetic eld while (in general) altering that state: only for the rst
of these can measurement serve to record the value of an observable. The in-
formation provided by a general quantum measurement is useful not because
it tells one what value some observable had on the measured system, nor
because it tells one what value some observable has acquired as a result of
the measurement, but because it guides expectations concerning the possible
results of future measurements either on the original state or on the state
after this initial measurement.
Freed from the need to think of measurement as a process directed to-
ward recording the value of some magnitude on a system, an analysis of mea-
surement on quantum eld systems should address two separate questions:
1) How can a measurement of a quantum eld lead to an outcome?
2) What makes a claim about a quantum eld magnitude signicant?
Deléglise et al.[42] report studies of many non-classical states of the elec-
tromagnetic eld in a cavity. The eld is probed by Rydberg atoms passed
through the cavity whose energy states become entangled with the state of the
cavity and are subsequently observed. Such an atom functions as a quantum
"probe", and the outcome of the eld measurement is objectied by observ-
ing the state of atomic excitation. That observation is performed by ionizing
the atom and detecting the emitted electron, a process that is selective since
di¤erent energy states are ionized in di¤erent electric eld strengths in the
detector. Unlike many measurements on the eld, observation of the atom
is thought of as a (destructive) measurement of an observable its energy.
Prior to this measurement, the atoms state was (typically) entangled, but
only with that of the cavity eld, so a claim about its energy lacked signi-
cance. But after detection of its ionized electron a claim about the state of
the detector acquires a rich signicance through environmental decoherence
of the detectors state. It is only at this stage that an objective outcome of
the cavity eld state measurement emerges. This involves no signicant claim
about a quantum eld magnitude, and no signicant claim about the value
of any magnitude on the atom not even about its energy. A measurement
of the quantum eld leads to an outcome only through decoherence in the
atom detector. What is measured is not a quantum eld magnitude.
This illustrates an important generic feature of measurements on a quan-
tum eld system that goes a long way toward answering question (1). The
outcome of such a measurement is recorded not in a claim about the value
of a magnitude on that quantum eld, but in a claim about the value of a
magnitude in a detector, even when that outcome is called the result of a mea-
surement of the eld. The state of the eld becomes entangled with that of
some subsystem of the detector, which is then decohered by interaction with
its environment. It is this decoherence that gives rise to an outcome of the
measurement not by "collapsing the state" (instead, the system-detector
entanglement is extended to the environment) but by rendering signicant
a claim about the value of a magnitude on the detector. The detector is de-
signed so that the truth of this claim may be readily checked and/or recorded
by directly examining it.
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While the result of the measurement is often expressed in language that
apparently commits its author to the existence and properties of physical
systems associated with a quantum eld (as in the example of single photon
detection) such talk should be seen as inferentially grounded in claims about
properties of some distinct probe or detector system involved in the mea-
surement. This "inferential buck-passing" is not a feature that distinguishes
measurement of quantum elds from measurement of other quantum systems,
as was illustrated by the measurement of the energy of the Rydberg atoms
used to probe the cavity eld. In no such case does the objectication of the
measurement outcome require the attribution of the measured property to
the measured system itself, either before or after the measurement.
It is in answering question (2) that a distinctive feature of quantum elds
appears. Along with quantum mechanics and other variants of quantum the-
ory, quantum eld theories share a common framework of quantum states
and probabilities, whose joint function is to advise an agent applying the
theory on the content and credibility of magnitude claims. The Born Rule
is applicable directly only to canonical magnitude claims those of the form
 has Q 2, for  a Borel set of real numbers, where Q is a magnitude
corresponding to self-adjoint operator Q^ on a Hilbert space (or in some alge-
bra of operators, in a more abstract form of quantum theory). In a quantum
eld theory, such magnitudes include components of elds such as the elec-
tric eld E(r) and magnitudes corresponding to the fermion number density
 ^y(r) ^(r), but not to the fermion eld  ^(r) itself. Fully to specify the content
of a canonical claim one must say what the system  is.
Call this system  the target of an application of quantum theory. While
targets will vary from application to application, most if not all systems g-
uring in canonical claims may be naturally grouped into two kinds: elds and
particles. Besides advising on the content of a predicate Q 2 , a quantum
state must also advise a user on the content of the singular or general term
 that picks out the target system (or systems) to which the predicate is
applied.
Quantum mechanics is targeted on systems of particles individually or
collectively. This is true of Diracs relativistic theory of electrons as well as
non-relativistic quantum mechanics as applied to condensed matter, mole-
cules, atoms or atomic constituents at low energies. While quantum eld
theory is supercially (and mathematically) a theory of elds, it is not tar-
geted on physical quantum eld systems. The canonical claims on which the
quantum state of a quantum eld theory directly o¤ers advice may concern
either classical elds or particles, depending on the circumstances in which
the theory is applied. Consider rst the case of the quantized electromagnetic
eld.
Kiefer[43],[44] analyzes the interaction of a quantized electromagnetic
eld with a quantized scalar matter eld ("scalar quantum electrodynam-
ics"). He describes circumstances in which this interaction has the e¤ect of
decohering the quantum state of the electromagnetic eld (in a Schrödinger
functional representation) so that the reduced state (after tracing over the
matter eld Hilbert space) rapidly becomes diagonal in a basis of WKB
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states that approximate a state of the classical electromagnetic eld with
quite well-dened electric eld and magnetic vector potential.
Anglin and Zurek[45] give a model in which the state of a quantized elec-
tromagnetic eld is decohered by a set of harmonic oscillators representing a
homogenous, linear, dielectric medium. In this model the reduced state of the
eld quickly becomes approximately diagonal in a basis of coherent states.
This shows how, in suitable circumstances, environmental decoherence can
select a basis of preferred states that closely approximate a classical electro-
magnetic eld. According to [14] this is exactly what is required to endow
a claim about the strength of the electric or magnetic eld at a point with
the signicance required to justify application of the Born Rule to assign a
probability to that claim. While their model incorporates a number of ide-
alizations that do not hold for an electromagnetic eld in a medium such
as the atmosphere, they argue that this result is robust enough to hold also
for electromagnetic radiation at wavelengths down to the ultraviolet propa-
gating through the air. Moreover the dynamics of the decohered states will
conform closely to classical electromagnetic theory. In a situation in which an
agent is warranted in ascribing a particular coherent initial quantum state to
the quantized electromagnetic eld, the Born Rule will entitle him to expect
the electric and magnetic elds to evolve in a way consistent with classical
electromagnetic theory.
Anglin and Zurek also discuss the status of photons and other "particles"
in the light of their model. Referring to the coherent states that provide a
stable, overcomplete basis for the decohered reduced state of a quantum eld
as pointer states, they conclude
Each pointer state of a quantum eld is surrounded, in Hilbert
space, by a quantum halo  a set of states which are negligibly deco-
hered from the pointer state over whatever time period is of interest.
When the environmental noise is weak enough that it does not sig-
nicantly degrade the pointer states themselves, this quantum halo is
large enough to contain at least a few particles, excited above the back-
ground classical eld conguration represented by the pointer state.
We have thus recovered the familiar eld-theoretic dichotomy between
background classical elds and N -particle excitations. The relative im-
munity of the particle excitations to decoherence, in comparison with
the strong decoherence of superpositions of distinct pointer states,
explains the coexistence of e¤ective classical electrodynamics and co-
herent propagation of photons. The n-particle excitations are not lo-
calized by our homogeneous environment. All localization occurs in
the space of coherent state amplitudes, and not in position space.[45,
p.7334]
This sheds further light on the extent to which application of the quan-
tum theory of the electromagnetic eld endows talk of photons with empir-
ical content. Even experimenters in quantum optics violate the injunction:
"whenever we talk about a particle, or more specically a photon, we should
only mean that which a click in the detectorrefers to". They do so when-
ever they speak of propagation of photons through an optical ber, the
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atmosphere, or empty space. A classical electromagnetic eld corresponding
to a coherent state can signicantly be said to propagate. When the coher-
ent state is surrounded by a quantum halo a space of "nearby" quantum
states it is tempting to say these states describe photons propagating with
the classical eld to which the coherent state corresponds, even though no
quantum state describes any physical system. But such talk can mislead.
One must remember that not every state in the quantum halo of a coher-
ent state can be thought to contain any denite number of photons: the
halo contains superpositions and mixtures corresponding to di¤erent "pho-
ton numbers", that are not decohered by the environment. Moreover, in an
experiment such as that of Ursin et al.[46] if one speaks of creating a pair
of entangled photons a,b one of which (a) traveled to one detector while the
other (b) traveled to another distant detector, this must either be understood
as merely a metaphorical gloss on claims about propagating classical elds,
non-linear sources and "detector clicks", or (consistent with an inferentialist
account of what gives a claim meaning) allowed to stand on its own provided
the inferences it is taken to support are carefully circumscribed.
In quantum theory one models target systems by assigning quantum
states to systems and applying the Born Rule. Models in quantum mechan-
ics (relativistic as well as non-relativistic) can be taken to assign quantum
states to the target systems themselves, be they electrons, atoms or other
particles.5 So the general practice of applying a signicant predicate Q 2
to electrons, atoms and other particles needs no defense in quantum mechan-
ics. But a model of a quantum eld theory such as quantum electrodynamics
assigns quantum states not to electrons or other target systems, but to an
abstract quantum eld system (such as interacting quantized electromagnetic
and charged lepton elds): model systems can no longer be identied with
target systems. So the attribution of location, momentum, spin, etc. to elec-
trons, atoms and other particles does require justication in an application
of a quantum eld theory model. It is clear that this cannot take the same
form as that just given for photon talk in the context of the quantum theory
of electromagnetism. We ascribe energy, momentum, spin, etc. to elementary
particles when applying the quantum eld theories of the Standard Model
and think of them as located in a particle accelerator or in one of the associ-
ated detectors used to test the Model. But unlike the electromagnetic eld,
neither the fermionic nor the massive bosonic elds of the Standard Model
have manifestations as classical elds.
Anglin and Zurek discuss this issue in their conclusion, where they ar-
gue that the key di¤erence between an application of a quantum eld theory
where classical eld-like behavior becomes manifest and an application where
classical particle-like behavior becomes manifest is the di¤erent character of
environmental coupling present in the two cases. Specically, while the elec-
tromagnetic eld typically couples to its environment through a linear cou-
pling, the electron eld (say) typically couples to its environment bi linearly.
They suggest (but do not give a comparable analysis to prove) that such a
5 But this is not necessary. Quantum models often represent quantum states e.g.
of abstract harmonic oscillator or spin systems in an appropriate Hilbert space
model in order to abstract from messy details of actual target systems.
22
coupling will select a basis of n-particle states, rather than coherent states,
as those that remain stable under environmental interactions. According to
the interpretation outlined in [14] this is exactly what is required to endow at
least some claims about the values of magnitudes on the particles present in
such a state with the signicance required to justify application of the Born
Rule to assign a probability to those claims.
This cannot be the whole story. Consider the suggestion that the signif-
icance of claims attributing classical eld values requires a linear coupling
to a decohering environment to select a basis of coherent states of a quan-
tized eld, while a bilinear coupling selects out n-particle states. This may
help explain the di¤erence between how we talk about certain gases as col-
lections of particles at ordinary temperatures but as coherent elds in BECs
at extremely low temperatures. But it seems unlikely that decoherence can
ground familiar claims about most of the extremely short-lived "elementary
particles" detected in high energy accelerators, whether bosons or fermions.
Perhaps claims apparently ascribing properties to these "particles" could be
rephrased as (non-descriptive) claims about states of their associated quan-
tum elds, just as talk of N photons in a cavity is often rephrased as talk
of an N -photon state. Alternatively, claims about properties of "elementary
particles" could derive their signicance from their inferential relations to
signicant descriptive claims about outcomes of measurements on their asso-
ciated quantum elds, along the lines of claims about positions of photons.
8 Conclusion
One can reconcile the observed outcomes of measurements with quantum
theory by recognizing the non-descriptive role of the quantum state. Deco-
herence grounds the signicance of claims about these outcomes and their
probabilities. But quantum theory assumes and cannot account for the fact
that measurements have outcomes (still less the particular outcome we ob-
serve) since it is not the role of a quantum state to represent a measurement
outcome.
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